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ABSTRACT 
 
Developing countries face a dilemma: to have either a stringent environmental policy 
that may lead to less foreign direct investment (FDI) or a less stringent environmental 
policy but more FDI through which economic growth may occur. Motivated by this 
paradox, it is necessary to examine the dynamic relationship between FDI, pollution 
control and corruption to suggest a mechanism that may be effective in combating the 
pollution haven effect. Using dynamic panel Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation for 110 countries from 2005 to 2012, the findings suggest that the stringency 
in environmental control alone has had a negative effect on FDI, and at the same time, 
high levels of corruption have attracted FDI inflows. Interestingly, in contrast to previous 
findings, our results show that high stringency in environmental control coupled with low 
levels of corruption has attracted significantly more FDI inflows. In other words, ethical 
institutions could nullify the negative effect of stringency in pollution control to FDIs. 
This finding, besides its robustness to various environmental stringency measures, is a 
potential answer to the pollution haven effect for developing countries. 
 
Keywords: FDI, pollution haven, corruption, economic growth, environmental 
stringency  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The pollution haven hypothesis or pollution haven effect is a phenomenon in 
which countries with less stringent environmental controls in place become a 
relocation destination for FDI due to relatively stringent environmental policy in 
other countries (Copeland & Taylor, 2004; Dean, Lovely, & Wang, 2009). Most 
previous research studies have failed to find strong evidence to support this 
hypothesis (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, & Stavins, 1995), while recent research 
studies with better theoretical frameworks and estimation techniques confirmed 
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the hypothesis (Becker & Henderson, 2000; Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004; 
Levinson & Taylor, 2008; Mulatu, Gerlagh, Rigby, & Wossink, 2010)1.  
 
As awareness of environmental sustainability has gained stronger support 
from both policy makers and government agencies in developing countries in 
recent years, stringent environmental regulations and pollution controls have 
been enacted to better protect the environment as well as promote sustainable 
economic development (Kyoto Protocol and Cleaner Air Act 2011, among 
others). This noble move is not without a cost to host countries. It is because a 
stricter pollution control policy could mean a significant reduction in potential 
FDI inflows (Copeland & Taylor, 2004). Consequently, developing countries 
may resort to increasing their comparative advantage by adopting lower 
environmental standards to attract foreign investment (Zhu, He, & Liu, 2014). 
This is in fact a race to the bottom competition, which further degrades the 
environment at the expense of FDI inflows. Over the last decades, it has become 
evident that most developing countries have attracted huge amounts of FDI from 
pollution-intensive industries (Cole, Elliott, & Fredriksson, 2006).  
 
The adverse effect will be more severe with high levels of corruption. 
Corrupt officials or entrusted authorities might abuse their power for their own 
interest in the enforcement of environmental regulations (Damania, 2002). The 
situation has worsened over the years to the extent that these countries have been 
regarded as pollution havens. Figure 1 clearly depicts the negative relationship 
between FDI and stringency level in developing countries. Unlike developing 
countries, developed countries experience a positive relationship between FDI 
and environmental stringency, (see Figure 2). In rectifying this unhealthy 
development, developing countries face a dilemma either to have a better control 
over the environment and less FDI or less control over the environment and more 
FDI, through which their economies may grow faster.  
 
All theoretical foundations support the importance of honest (not corrupt) 
institutions or bureaucrats to attract FDI inflows for sustainable economic 
growth. Barassi and Zhou (2012) use parametric and non-parametric methods to 
reassess the findings on the relationship between FDI and corruption and they 
find robust evidence that host countries with lower corruption levels than the 
average of Corruption Perception Index would attract FDI stock higher than other 
host countries of the same percentile of the FDI stock. However, Barassi and 
Zhou (2012) and most existing studies of FDI-corruption seem to overlook the 
presence of environmental regulations. The effect of corruption might be 
substantive when explaining foreign investment in the presence of environmental 
regulations (Fredriksson, List, & Millimet, 2003; Kellenberg, 2009; Mudambi, 
Navarra, & Delios, 2013). Cole et al. (2006) recently examine the influence of 
environmental policy on the FDIs and find that high FDIs inflow to the stringent 
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environmental policy countries only when they have significant levels of 
corruption. 
 
 
Figure 1. FDI and environmental stringency for 77 non-OECD countries  
 
 
Figure 2. FDI and environmental stringency for 30 OECD countries  
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the existence of pollution haven 
effect in the presence of corruption across countries. Furthermore, this study 
attempts to provide an insight on how to attract more FDIs but at the same time 
maintain prudent control of their natural environment. This paper may help to 
reveal answers for mixed findings of the pollution haven and FDI-corruption 
nexus. In particular, we provide empirical evidence to demonstrate the positive 
effects of environmental regulations on FDI by having high quality institutions. 
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This paper contributes to the pollution haven literature in three ways. 
First, this study empirically supports the pollution haven hypothesis, but it is non-
monotonic. The relationship between FDI and environmental stringency is non-
linear and contingent to corruption level. Second, this study justifies the need for 
honest bureaucrats together with stringent environmental policies. A certain level 
of honesty must be achieved to avoid the pollution haven phenomenon. Third, 
this research relies upon dynamic panel method, which addresses the endogeneity 
problem of independent variables and country-specific effects on heterogeneous 
panels. Apart from being both efficient and non-bias, the estimated coefficient is 
statistically more reliable. 
 
 
MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Model Specification 
 
Following Barassi and Zhou (2012), we estimate the following model by 
controlling for environmental stringency and corruption on FDI inflow. The 
model specification is as follows: 
 
, , 1 1 2 3−= + + + × + + +i t i t it it it it i itFDI αFDI β STR β COR β STR COR λX' η ε    (1) 
 
where subscripts i and t denote country and year, respectively, FDI is FDI inflow 
of host country in billions of US dollars, STR is stringency of environmental 
regulations, COR is level of corruption that ranges from 1 to 10 with a higher 
value indicating less corruption. Here we can deduce that a low level of 
corruption also means a higher level of honesty or integrity, and X are controlled 
variables that influence FDI inflows, including openness, inflation, GDP growth, 
total population, financial development and infrastructure. The country-specific 
effect is represented by η, and β1, β2, β3, λ, α will be estimated by the GMM 
estimator, and ε is the error term. The lagged dependent variable is taken into 
account as data on FDI inflows often exhibit persistent trends. We speculate that 
profit-maximising MNEs or investors respond homogeneously towards 
heterogeneity of environmental regulations. Therefore, the sign for β1 should be 
negative, which means relatively stringent environmental regulations deter FDI 
whilst a lack of environmental regulations induces FDI. In other words, the 
pollution haven effect can be validated in this finding. Based on the findings of 
Egger and Winner (2005), we can confirm that the expected sign of β2 is 
negative, which means corruption is a stimulus for FDI. The sign of the 
interaction term β3 would contribute to the on-going debate particularly in the 
study of FDI and corruption. The parameter indicates how environmental 
stringency and corruption together behave toward FDI. The long run effects can 
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be derived by dividing each of the βi by (1− 𝛼), the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable. 
 
Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation  
 
Potential endogeneity of independent variables, inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable and the presence of the country-specific effects have made it impossible 
for us to estimate using panel estimation models such as pooled OLS or fixed and 
random effect. Problems aforementioned would bring Nickell (1981) bias if we 
used the panel data estimation. The generalised method of moment (GMM) 
estimation proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) has the capability to eliminate 
these problems. The GMM method can tackle the country-specific effects by 
taking the first differences of equation (1). However, the data set has missing 
values for some explanatory variables and will subsequently bring difficulties in 
the transformed data (Roodman, 2009). Therefore, the forward orthogonal 
deviation transformation procedure proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) is 
used to wipe out the country-specific effects. However, new bias appears to have 
resulted from forward orthogonal deviation, which is correlation between a 
lagged dependent variable and the error terms. Arellano and Bond (1991) and 
Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest that the lagged levels, lagged two or more 
periods should be used as instruments for the difference, lagged dependent 
variables and other endogenous variables. This method can be referred to as 
either one-step or two-step difference GMM. 
 
Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
show that if the lagged dependent variable and independent variables follow a 
random walk or are persistent over time, the lagged levels of these variables are 
poor instruments for the regression equation in differences. Arellano and Bover 
(1995) suggest a system GMM estimator to reduce the biases and imprecision 
produced by a different estimator by estimating the different equation and the 
level equation as a system. In the system estimation, the instruments for the 
regression in levels are the lagged first-differenced variables. We adopt the two-
step system GMM in this study because the two-step GMM is more favoured 
than the one-step GMM in estimating the coefficient with lower bias and standard 
errors (Windmeijer, 2005). 
 
The consistency, efficiency and lack of bias of the GMM estimator is 
contingent on three specification tests, namely the Hansen or Sargan test for 
over-identifying restrictions, the serial correlation test for disturbances, and the 
difference in Hansen test for extra moment's conditions (Arellano & Bond, 1991; 
Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). The Hansen or Sargan test is 
based on the overall validity of the instruments and is conducted by analysing the 
sample analogue of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. Failure 
Tamat Sarmidi, Abu Hassan Shaari Md Nor and Sulhi Ridzuan 
90 
to reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen or Sargan test would indicate that the 
instruments employed are valid. The serial correlation test is conducted to 
diagnose the presence of second order autocorrelation in the different equation. 
Failure to reject the null hypotheses of the difference in Hansen test would give 
support to the validity of additional moment conditions. These three specification 
tests are considered in this paper. Failure to reject the null hypotheses of these 
three specification tests would confirm that all the instruments used are valid and 
the GMM results are well specified.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
FDI inflows (USbill) 10.46 22.66 –28.26 196.39 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) 53.47 9.58 32.54 77.99 
WEF’s stringency of environmental 
regulation  4.16 1.10 2.00 6.70 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 4.44 2.23 1.40 9.60 
Control of Corruption, Kaufmann et al. 
(2010) 2.62 1.05 1.02 5.05 
GDP growth  3.89 4.99 –17.95 34.50 
Inflation, consumer prices  6.11 5.16 –4.86 44.39 
Private sector credit (% of GDP) 96.89 683.39 6.03 15788.26 
Total population (per 1000 people) 50446.36 168726.40 214.65 1337705.00 
Openness ((Export + Import)/GDP) 92.42 51.45 22.12 444.10 
Telephone lines (per 100 people) 22.96 18.13 0.29 67.24 
 
Note: List of countries used in the analysis; Angola, Finland, Luxembourg, Senegal, Argentina, France, 
Macedonia, Serbia, Armenia, Gabon, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Georgia, Malta, Slovak, Republic Austria, 
Germany, Mexico, Slovenia, Azerbaijan, Ghana, Moldova, South Africa, Belarus, Greece, Mongolia, Spain, 
Belgium, Guatemala, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Bolivia, Haiti, Mozambique, Sudan, Botswana, Honduras, Namibia, 
Sweden, Brazil, Hungary, Nepal, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Iceland, Netherlands, Syria, Cameroon, India, New 
Zealand, Tajikistan, Canada, Indonesia, Nicaragua, Tanzania, China, Iran, Nigeria, Thailand, Colombia, Ireland, 
Norway, Togo, Costa Rica, Italy, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Cote d'Ivoire, Jamaica, Pakistan, Tunisia, 
Croatia, Japan, Panama, Turkey, Cyprus, Jordan, Paraguay, Ukraine, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Peru, United 
Arab Emirates, Denmark, Kenya, Philippines, United Kingdom, Ecuador, Korea Rep., Poland, Uruguay, Egypt, 
Kuwait, Portugal, Vietnam, El Salvador, Kyrgyz Republic, Qatar, Yemen, Eritrea, Latvia, Romania, Zambia, 
Estonia, Libya, Russia, Ethiopia, Lithuania, and Saudi  Arabia 
 
Data 
 
The model uses unbalanced panel data from 110 developed and developing 
countries for the period of 2005 to 2012, (see full list of countries in Table 1). 
FDI inflow data are expressed as FDI inflows billions of dollars and is available 
from the UNCTAD. The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) obtained from 
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Yale University is used as a proxy for stringency of environmental regulations. 
We verified the robustness of our results by substituting EPI data with data from 
the World Economic Forum's (WEF) Executive Opinion Survey. The WEF’s 
stringency of environmental regulation index has been widely used to measure 
stringency of environmental regulations in recent studies (e.g., Kalamova & 
Johnstone, 2011). The corruption perception index (CPI) was obtained from 
Transparency International to measure the level of corruption in host countries. 
The index was scaled from 0 to 10, where a higher score indicated a higher level 
of honesty. An alternative to the index, Control of Corruption, was obtained from 
the World Governance Indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2010). The 
index was rescaled by adding 2.5 to the original data, which were scaled from 0 
to 5, in which a higher value indicated a higher level of honesty. Hence, in this 
paper, a negative coefficient for COR means a high level of corruption induces 
FDI. The remaining controlled variables were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the 
data used in the study. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 2 shows the result of the GMM estimates of the baseline model (Model 1) 
and the subsequent models (Model 2 to Model 7) used in the analysis. Based on 
the three specification tests conducted, the GMM estimators are unbiased, 
consistent and efficient. The sign for environmental regulatory stringency 
supports the pollution haven effect in which the presence of stringent 
environmental regulations is found to have negative impact on the FDI. Model 1 
to Model 4 from Table 2 show the full sample analysis, which suggests that a 
one-point increase in stringency measured by EPI is related to the decrease in 
FDI inflows by approximately 0.243 to 0.700 in short run and 0.402 to 1.118 in 
long run. The result is consistent for OECD and non-OECD countries that show a 
negative relationship between environmental stringency and FDI. The result 
supports the pollution haven hypothesis as in Kalamova and Johnstone (2011).  
 
The study also reveals that corruption is negatively significant to FDI. 
The result implies that high levels of corruption attract more FDI. This result is 
not surprising because many investors try to cut the red tape or bureaucracy with 
corruption in developing countries. This result also implies that honesty 
(antonym of corruption) has a negative effect on FDI and is consistent with the 
results of Egger and Winner (2005), who showed that corruption can be a 
"helping hand" for FDI inflow. 
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Thus far, the results of this study are not in favour of stringent policy 
control. The situation is worsening with corrupt bureaucrats. Surprisingly, the 
effect of an interaction term between environmental stringency and corruption 
(STR × COR) is positive and significant. This implies that environmental 
stringency and honesty (inverse of corruption) cannot be analysed independently. 
Stringent environmental control policy should be combined with integrated law 
enforcement and honest bureaucrats; in other words, good policy needs to be 
enforced by honest bureaucrats to have a positive impact on FDI. Another 
interesting finding from the analysis is that the positive coefficient of 𝛽3 from the 
partial derivative of Equation 1  and   
 
it it
it it
dFDI dFDI
dSTR dCOR
can be interpreted as the 
threshold level that could nullify the negative effects of environmental stringency 
and corruption on FDI. Setting 
 
 
 
it
it
dFDI
dSTR
 to 0 will provide the honesty threshold 
level. For instance for model 2, the threshold level is 1
3
 
 
 
β
β
, which is 9.615
2.548
 
 
 
 or 
3.7735 level of honesty. For Model 1 and 3, the threshold levels are 5.8 and 6.2, 
respectively. At any point above this threshold level, stringency in environmental 
policy will no longer have a negative impact on FDI. This interesting finding can 
be an answer to the on-going debate of the impact of FDI on both environmental 
regulation and corruption. This corruption's threshold value seemed to be 
somewhat complementary to the findings of Barassi and Zhou (2012), who found 
that a less corrupt country would encourage more FDI stock than a more corrupt 
country if they share the same percentile in the FDI stock cumulative distribution. 
The positive coefficients of the interaction term are consistent with the results of 
Kirkpatrick and Shimamoto (2008) and imply that transparency, consistency, and 
accountability in the regulatory environment can provide perception of a safer 
investment climate and subsequently gain investor confidence towards host 
countries, hence encouraging FDI. Our results contradict the findings of Kheder 
and Zugravu (2012) who declare that investors favour countries with relatively 
weak environmental regulations regardless of the corruption level of host 
countries. It is noteworthy that Kheder and Zugravu (2012) do not consider the 
interaction between environmental stringency and corruption. 
 
The estimation result with respect to sign and magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient are consistent for OECD and non-OECD countries as shown in Table 
2. The result is robust for different environmental stringency measures used, i.e., 
either EPI or WEF and for various corruption indicators such as corruption 
perception index or the worldwide governance indicators by Kaufmann et al. 
(2010). The findings strongly support the conjecture that pollution haven occurs 
in a strict environmental regulations economy but with corrupt institutions. The 
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phenomenon of the "helping hand" is also supported by these results because 
high levels of corruption promote FDI as discussed in Egger and Winner (2005). 
Interestingly, the significant and positive coefficient of the interaction term 
between stringency and corruption for all models provides consistently robust 
evidence on the effect contingent upon FDI under different corruption threshold 
levels.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study is to empirically assess the role of corruption and 
stringency of environmental regulations on FDI inflows in 110 developed and 
developing countries within the period of 2005 to 2012. Dynamic panel GMM 
techniques are employed to control for potential endogeneity of independent 
variables and country-specific effects.  
 
There are several major findings in this paper. First, using different 
proxies for environmental pollution stringency, the findings are consistent with 
the previous findings that support pollution haven hypothesis, i.e., the idea that 
pollution leniency policy attracts more FDI. Second, stringent environmental 
policy alone will discourage FDI inflows. Third, if an economy wants to 
continuously enjoy FDI inflows and at the same time protect the environment, 
institutional development that promotes honesty, ethics, and trustworthiness is a 
crucial prerequisite. Finally, the study suggests that a certain level of honesty 
must be established so that all countries are not necessarily engaging in the race 
to the bottom competition. 
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NOTE 
 
1. In contrast to the pollution haven hypothesis, the "Porter Hypothesis" argues 
that complying with environmental regulation is not a choice. It is because 
new and greener technology is always cost efficient in the long run and 
therefore the benefit will offset the extra cost incurred to comply with 
environmental regulation (Porter & van der Linde 1995; Hamamoto, 2006; 
Kumar & Managi, 2009, among others). 
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